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In this paper, we study the strategies of bidders in a sequence of auctions sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to determine participants in the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP). The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production
and put it to a conservation use. Farmers wishing to participate bid the price per acre
they will receive if accepted into the program. In addition, an environmental score is
calculated which attempts to measure the potential environmental beneﬁts of idling the
oﬀered parcel. The score is the sum of six separate categories each expressing diﬀerent
environmental attributes such as wildlife habitat, water quality or soil erosion reduction.
This score is then combined with the farmer’s bid to obtain an index which provides the
ranking used to decide program participants.
The main objective of this paper is to understand how farmers formulate optimal
bidding strategies when competing in the CRP auctions. Since individual environmen-
tal scores measure diﬀerent potential environmental beneﬁts, some of which could aﬀect
long term farm proﬁtability and land values whereas others are more of a public goods
nature, exactly how farmers condition their bids on those individual categories should
reveal information about farmers’ preferences towards conservation and protection of the
environment. Modelling this unique institution allows us to do two things: ﬁrst, explain
how bidders formulate bids given diﬀerences in the environmental characteristics of their
land and second, uncover farmers’ preferences towards diﬀerent categories of environ-
mental beneﬁts. Extending the approach of Latacz-Lohman and Van der Hamsvoort
(1997) by incorporating asymmetric beliefs, we develop a structural model which de-
scribes the unique solution for the optimal bid which separates the measurement of the
farmer’s valuation of the CRP environmental beneﬁts from the strategic eﬀect due to
the program scoring rules. An increase in an individual environmental score has two
eﬀects on the optimal bid: it raises a farmer’s total score which increases the prob-
ability a bid is accepted (a positive-strategic eﬀect) and it raises a farmer’s long run
1proﬁt/utility thereby lowering the opportunity cost of CRP participation (a negative-
environmental eﬀect). The model identiﬁes these two eﬀects even when the trade-oﬀ
between environmental scores and bids is unknown.
The empirical analysis is carried out using the individual contract data from North
Carolina for three CRP sign-ups following the major changes in the program structure.
The results show that farmers do in fact condition bids on the strength of their envi-
ronmental score and that farmers consistently value those environmental improvements
which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less em-
phasis on those beneﬁts which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife
habitat.
2 Program Description and Data
The US Conservation Reserve Program was introduced in the Food Security Act of 1985
(the 1985 Farm Bill). According to the program, a farmer can bid qualiﬁed land into the
program and, if the bid is accepted, contract to receive annual rental payments equal
to the value of the submitted bid in exchange for removing the land from agricultural
production and putting it to a conservation use. In addition to an annual per-acre rental
payment, the farmer may request a one-time cost share payment to partially oﬀset the
cost of conservation practices she promised to install on her land. This contract is
generally for 10 or 15 years. There are announced sign-up periods when farmers can
oﬀer bids to place land into the program.
The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (the 1996 Farm Bill)
made some fundamental changes to the CRP. It placed additional restrictions on quali-
fying land and the total acreage that could be accepted into the program (36.4 million
acres nationally, 10% of each state’s total cropland and 25% of the county’s total crop-
land). It also required for the ﬁrst time an upper limit on acceptable bids. The maximum
acceptable bid (cap) was now equal to the average land rental rate for each soil type
2in the county where the proposed CRP land is located, plus a $5 per acre maintenance
allowance (USDA 1997). The Bill also provided for continuous sign-up periods for par-
ticular partial-ﬁeld practices, such as riparian buﬀer strips, that involve a small amount
of acreage, but provide a disproportionately large environmental beneﬁt.
There have been 29 sign-up periods since the CRP’s inception. Bids in sign-up
periods 1-9 were not ranked according to the potential environmental beneﬁts the parcel
would provide. Beginning with the 10th sign-up period an Environmental Beneﬁts Index
(EBI) was calculated for each parcel oﬀered but this information was not shared with
farmers prior to the submission of bids. Finally, starting with the 15th sign-up period
producers were made aware of most of the scoring rules making up the EBI before the
sign-up period. The data used in this study cover the 15th, 16th and 18th sign-up
periods in North Carolina. Both the 15th and 16th sign-up periods were held in 1997,
the 17th sign-up period was a continuous sign-up, and the 18th sign-up period was held
in late fall of 1998.
In order to rank bidders, the EBI combined the environmental scores (N1-N6) that
measure the potential environmental beneﬁts of an oﬀered parcel with the cost factor
(N7). Of the six environmental scores, N3 (on-farm beneﬁts from reduced wind and water
erosion) and N4 (long term beneﬁts of cover beyond the contract period) measure beneﬁts
that are largely concentrated on the farm in the form of increased future productivity
of land once the retired land comes back into agricultural service. In addition, the
CRP provides environmental beneﬁts that are spread across a larger area beyond the
farm borders such as wildlife habitat (N1), water quality (N2) and air quality beneﬁts
(N5). Finally, score N6 (beneﬁts from enrollment in conservation priority area) does
not correspond to any plot-speciﬁc environmental potential. All parcels located in a
given geographical area automatically earn 25 points regardless of their environmental
characteristics. The cost factor (N7) is obtained by converting a farmer’s dollar bid
(rental rate oﬀered) into EBI points using a particular transformation scheme. For
example, if in the 15th sign-up a farmer submitted a bid of $40/acre and requested no
3cost-share money, N7 equals 153.94 (143.94+10), if she submitted a bid of $30, her N7
would increase to 165.45.
The empirical analysis in this paper is performed with the individual CRP contracts
data that contains the following variables: acres oﬀered, rental rate oﬀered (bid), max-
imum pay rate (cap), total cost share, environmental scores (N1-N6), cost factor (N7)
and the total EBI (
P7
k=1 Nk). The composition of the EBI was changed slightly between
the 15th and 16th sign-ups by shifting some of the weight from a cost factor to environ-
mental factors. The maximum number of points for air quality beneﬁts from reduced
wind erosion (N5) increased from 25 to 35, the relative importance of the cost factor
(N7) has decreased from 33% in the 15th sign-up to 27% in the 16th sign-up and the
maximum total score decreased from 600 to 560.
3 An Optimal Bidding Model
We assume that farmers are risk neutral and each of them is endowed with a piece of
land of a given size and ﬁxed characteristics which can be either farmed or enrolled in
the CRP in its entirety. Participation in the CRP generates a stream of conservation
payments from the government, imposes certain costs caused by an immediate loss of
farming income and creates non-stochastic on-farm and oﬀ-farm environmental beneﬁts.
When placing a bid, each farmer holds private expectations about the stream of
discounted future proﬁts from farming y and environmental beneﬁts caused by idling
the land under the CRP contract e. Both y and e are measured relative to the status
quo of leaving the land in agricultural production. The discounted future stream of
government payments to program participants is denoted by b. From a farmer’s point
of view, the cost of program participation can be deﬁned as the net agricultural cost of
retired land (including both current costs and future beneﬁts) C = y − e > 0, where
both y and e are the functions of soil and other environmental characteristics of the plot.
The net beneﬁts of enrolling the land into the program are simply b − C.
4Consider the problem of the farmer deciding on the bid b that she is going to sub-
mit to the program for a parcel with environmental score s.2 Let β be the unknown
largest possible bid that the farmer can submit and still win acceptance into the pro-
gram. Assume that beliefs about β are given by a continuously diﬀerentiable conditional
probability “density” f with full support on [0, ¯ β) where ¯ β is the bid cap. There is also a
probability that a bid of ¯ β will be accepted, so F(¯ β) ≤ 1 where F(b) =
R b
0 f(u)du is the
cumulative density function of f. Hence, the probability that a bid is accepted is given
by P(b ≤ β) = 1 − F(b). In the discussion that follows, we take the farmer’s beliefs f
as given, but will return to address beliefs in more detail at the end of this section.
The optimal bid b∗ will be the one that maximizes the expected beneﬁts of CRP
participation over and above the beneﬁts from farming and it is found by maximizing
π(b) = (b − C)[1 − F(b)] with respect to b. An interior solution is given by the ﬁrst
order condition:
1 − F(b) − f(b)(b − C) = 0 (1)






The above solution is the unique maximum as long as the cost of program participation
is less than ¯ β −
1−F(¯ β)
f(¯ β) and the appropriate second-order condition is globally satisﬁed.
The second order condition can be written as:
2f(b) + f
0(b)(b − C) > 0 (3)
Distributions that satisfy (3) are generally skewed towards the bid cap. Examples include
the uniform distribution, the beta(r,s) distribution with parameters s > r > 1 and any
distribution with a non-decreasing density.
2This is a simpliﬁcation because the actual bids submitted by farmers are per acre annual rental rates
B whereas b =
PT
t=0 δtB is the present value of the stream of submitted bids (annual CRP payments)
over the length of the contract period T.
5When ¯ β −
1−F(¯ β)
f(¯ β) ≤ C ≤ ¯ β, the optimal bid is to simply bid the cap. When the
opportunity cost of program participation C exceeds the cap, the bidder has no moti-
vation to participate. Hence while ¯ β is meant to measure the opportunity cost of land
(if C = ¯ β the farmer collects no rents), in fact it simply sets an upper bound for land
values in the population of farmers who participate in the auction, i.e. for those for
whom C < ¯ β.
The formula for the optimal bid (2) indicates that bidders mark-up their bids above
the net agricultural cost by
1−F(b)
f(b) ≥ 0. The magnitude of the mark-up can be thought
of as the information rent earned by the farmers due to their private information about
the opportunity cost of participation. It is also apparent that given ﬁxed beliefs f, the
potential for environmental improvement (either through increased future productivity
of land or a more pleasant environment) reduces the cost of program participation C
and hence the bid.
3.1 Modelling Farmers’ Beliefs
In the rest of the paper, we assume that farmers share common beliefs about CRP scoring
rules and the bids and scores of their competitors, but diﬀer systematically conditional
on their own environmental scores, that is, the asymmetric beliefs across farmers stem
from their environmental scores.
Let density f be conditioned on s such that:
s > s
0 → F(b|s) < F(b|s
0)∀b ∈ [0, ¯ β), (4)
That is, s > s0 implies F|s ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F|s0. While this condition
implies that the probability of any bid being accepted increases as s increases, this is not
the same as guaranteeing that the bid will increase as s increases. Notice that the ﬁrst
order condition for the farmer’s maximization problem is the same as in (1) except that
F(b) and f(b) are now replaced with F(b|s) and f(b|s). Applying the implicit function
theorem to the ﬁrst order condition holding C constant, we can show that the optimal







∂s (b∗ − C)
2f(b∗|s) + f0(b∗|s)(b∗ − C)
(5)
The denominator is positive by the second order condition, hence db∗
ds is going to be posi-
tive as long as the numerator is negative. Based on the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
∂F(b∗|s)









Given (3) and (6), there will continue to be a unique optimal bid given by (2) were
the expressions for f are replaced with their conditional counterparts. Intuitively, (6)
restricts the density from changing too fast as s changes. In order for db∗
ds to be positive,
the probability a bid is accepted must change at a bounded rate and the density can not
increase dramatically in any region of the support.3
Applying the implicit function theorem to (1) with f replaced with f|s, we obtain
another comparative statics result describing how the optimal bid varies with net agri-





2f(b∗|s) + f0(b∗|s)(b∗ − C)
(7)
Since the denominator is positive by the second order condition and the numerator is
positive by deﬁnition, the optimal bid is always increasing in the net agricultural costs C,
no matter what the distribution F(b|s). Since C = y −e is decreasing in environmental
beneﬁts, it follows that the optimal bid must be decreasing in environmental beneﬁts.
Notice, that under farmers’ asymmetric beliefs about the probability of winning the
contract, the optimal bidding formula is an increasing function of program participation
cost (and therefore decreasing in environmental beneﬁts potential) and the total envi-
ronmental score s. A signiﬁcant feature of the CRP auctions is that farmers do not know
3For example, a class of densities which satisfy both (3) and (6) is given by a non-decreasing density
function where ¯ β = 1, F(1) = 1 − cs where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, s ∈ (0,1) and
∂f
∂s = c.
7the trade-oﬀ between bids and environmental scores. Ex post, the trade-oﬀs have been
linear, but ex ante, they are (and continue to be) unknown. Farmers are only told that
higher scores improve their chances of acceptance, hence, the most that we can require
is that the rule be monotonic as it is here.
4 An Econometric Model
Although the previously developed model does not provide a closed form solution for
the optimal bid, it does establish a behavioral relationship between bids and measures
in our data. When farmers share common beliefs, the optimal bid is increasing in the
individual farmer’s opportunity cost of program participation. While we can not measure
the individual opportunity cost directly, we know that it has to be smaller than the bid
cap (otherwise the farmer would not bother submitting the bid) and that it has to be
decreasing in the environmental potential of the oﬀered plot. Measurements of potential
environmental beneﬁts are given by the individual categories of the EBI score N1 through
N6 received by the farm. When beliefs are asymmetric, f becomes conditioned on s and
there is a second (strategic) eﬀect on optimal bid through the total score s. Namely, bids
are increasing in environmental scores based on the indirect eﬀect of any Nk through
the sum s =
P6
k=1 Nk on beliefs f|s. Overall, an increase in an individual environmental
score has two eﬀects on the optimal bid: ﬁrst, it raises farmer’s long run beneﬁts either
through increased future soil productivity or a more pleasant environment thus lowering
the optimal bid (the direct environmental eﬀect), and second, it raises a farmer’s total
score which increases the probability a bid is accepted thus increasing the optimal bid
(the indirect strategic eﬀect).
In the most general form, the optimal bid can be written as a function of the indi-
vidual components of the farm’s environmental score:
b
∗ = g0(N1,...,N6) (8)
where g0 is an unknown function in which the slopes are indeterminate. To capture the
8dual eﬀect of scores on farmer’s optimal bidding strategy, we rewrite (8) as a separable
function of individual environmental categories and the total environmental score:
b
∗ = g1(s) + g2(N1,...,N6) = g(s,N1,...,N6) (9)
where now g is monotonic in all its arguments as per equation (2). While individual
components of the environmental score N1 through N6 should predict bidding behavior
through their measure of environmental factors aﬀecting the farm, the total score s =
P6
k=1 Nk aﬀects the probability that a bid is accepted. We expect g to be non-increasing
in the individual components of the environmental score, but increasing in the total score










representing two separate eﬀects: a) the eﬀect on future farmer’s proﬁt/utility given by
the increased future productivity of the soil and better environment and b) the increase
in payments accruing to the bidder as a result of her land being perceived by CRP as
environmentally more valuable thereby commanding a higher environmental score. The
former component represents the farmer’s valuation of environmental beneﬁts at the
margin, whereas the latter component represents the marginal information rent.
Since the total score s is perfectly co-linear with its components, g is necessarily
nonlinear in order to identify the model. This poses no conceptual diﬃculties however,
since there is no reason to believe that any measure of beneﬁts from an improved envi-
ronment are linear in EBI components (which are imperfect, ad-hoc measures). In order
to estimate (9) above, we specify a ﬂexible Box-Cox model for the optimal bid as:
b∗
¯ β





λ + . (11)
Here xλ = xλ−1
λ is the Box-Cox transformation which nests both a linear (λ = 1) and a
logarithm speciﬁcation (λ = 0); see Greene (1999, pp. 329-335). We anticipate the slope
9parameters from (11) to correspond to the predictions of our model, i.e. β1,...,β6 ≤ 0
and β0 > 0.4
Notice also that the bid interval [0, ¯ β] has been normalized to the unit interval which
implicitly makes environmental gains proportional to land values. Recall that the bid
cap is determined by the CRP administration as the average land rental rate for the
corresponding soil type in the county where the land is located. Despite the fact that
the cap varies across our sample, it does not capture farmers’ idiosyncrasies but instead
simply serves as an upper bound on the legally acceptable bids. Consequently, , treated
here as a normal random variable, captures the deviation of individual farmers’ land
values (which are bidders’ private information) from the county and soil type averages.
In order to correct for the censoring which occurs at the bid cap (in each sign-up over
25% of bidders bid the maximum), we ﬁt a right-censored tobit model to our bidding
equation.5
5 Estimation Results
We estimate model (11) separately for each of the three sign-ups by maximum likelihood
via grid search over values of λ between -2 and 2. Environmental categories n1 through
n6 are measured as (N1+1) through (N6+1) to insure positive values. The results are
summarized in Table 1. In order to provide a familiar baseline, the constrained linear
model (λ = 1,β0 = 0) is also reported. The log-likelihood ratio statistics for the linear
restriction (λ = 1) and the logarithmic speciﬁcation (λ = 0) are reported at the bottom
of the table. While we strongly reject the linear speciﬁcation in all sign-ups, we cannot
reject the logarithmic speciﬁcation for the 15th and 18th sign-ups. The estimated values
4The linearity in arguments assumption in (11) is not completely harmless. While our theoretical
model imposes separability between the sum of scores s and the individual components N1,...,N6 as
well as monotonicity of the bidding function with respect to its arguments, the true form of g cannot
be identiﬁed except under strong conditions (see White 1980, and Inoue 2002).
5Results from OLS are qualitatively similar.
10of λ in all three sign-ups are all less than unity implying decreasing marginal beneﬁts of
measured environmental attributes.
The obtained results clearly show that farmers condition their bids on their total
environmental scores. The estimated coeﬃcient for total score s is positive as predicted
by the theory and signiﬁcant in all three sign-ups. The importance of the strategic eﬀect
in the formulation of the equilibrium bid can be measured by evaluating the derivative
of the optimal bid function with respect to s (the second term on the right hand side
of (10)). Whereas farmers do not know the exact relationship between the monetary
bid and the cost factor (i.e. the exact formula for N7) while submitting their bids, they
implicitly establish the trade-oﬀ between the two. For each point increase in their total
score farmers increased their bids by an average of 1.5 cents in the 15th sign-up, 48 cents
in the 16th sign-up and 10 cents in the 18th sign-up. As a reference point, the true,
ex-ante unknown, conversion formula shows that the implicit marginal trade-oﬀ between
monetary bids and N7 was 87 cents per point in the 15th sign-up and 57 cents (within
$15 of the bid cap) in the 16th and 18th sign-ups.
The main point of interest in this paper is the estimation of the farmers’ income-
environment trade-oﬀ. The results indicate that in addition to direct monetary payoﬀs
from the government, farmers are also interested in the long term environmental beneﬁts
stemming from the CRP participation. In all three sign-ups both parameters measuring
the on-farm beneﬁts (reduced erosion - N3 and long term beneﬁts - N4) are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant thus conﬁrming that farmers are willing to shade their bids
if they anticipate future productivity gains and hence increased proﬁts from the reduced
soil erosion.6 To the extent that dynamic ineﬃciencies associated with soil degradation
6This result diﬀers from Miranda (1992) who found diﬀerences in the relationship between the bid
and future on-farm productivity gains across regions. With the exception of the Corn Belt and Lake
States, farmers either did not understand or were failing to act on the on-farm productivity eﬀects caused
by soil erosion. With minor exceptions, in all other areas (including Southeast where North Carolina
belongs) landowners did not systematically take the soil productivity eﬀects into consideration when
formulating their land management strategies.
11come from farmers’ disregard for future soil productivity (myopic behavior), our results
show that farmers do in fact behave as long term proﬁt maximizers.
In the group of oﬀ-farm beneﬁts, the results are a bit more ambiguous. The estimated
coeﬃcients for wildlife habitat (N1) are insigniﬁcant at the 5% level in the 15th and 18th
sign-ups indicating that farmers may not value this environmental beneﬁt. Another
explanation may be free-riding. Insofar as N1 represents a true public good, farmers
know that those beneﬁts will be provided whether they enter the CRP or not. The same
is true for air quality beneﬁts N5 where the estimated coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant in all
three sign-ups. However, this result can also be a consequence of very small values of
N5 and little variation in potential air quality beneﬁts across farms in North Carolina.
The values of the coeﬃcients for water quality beneﬁts from reduced water erosion,
run-oﬀ and leaching (N2) in the 16th and 18th sign-ups are negative, along the lines with
the coeﬃcient estimates obtained for on-farm beneﬁts. This is not surprising given that
the deﬁnition of N2 covers some of the beneﬁts which may be interpreted as on-farm
similar to N3. The problem is that the sign of N2 in the 15th sign-up is positive (and
signiﬁcant) for which we have no convincing explanation.
Overall, our results clearly indicate that CRP bidders value the environmental eﬀects
of program participation. As a rough upper bound for this value, the diﬀerence in bids
between a farm with the highest possible score and the lowest possible score (N1 =
... = N6 = 0), ignoring the strategic eﬀect of s, is about $10.48 per acre per year in
the 15th sign-up. In comparison to an average submitted bid of $43.42, this amounts to
approximate 20 percent reduction in demanded government compensation. We also see
evidence for bidders internalizing those beneﬁts which directly aﬀect future productivity
such as reduced soil erosion (N3) and long-term beneﬁts of cover (N4) more consistently
than those beneﬁts which focus on a large area or enhance the environment but not
the productivity of their land such as wildlife habitat (N1), water quality (N2) and air
quality (N5).
Similarly to the evaluation of the strategic eﬀect, we can also compute the marginal
12environmental beneﬁts eﬀect of a one point increase in any environmental category. As
seen from (10), the total eﬀect is then the sum of two eﬀects: strategic and environmental
beneﬁts eﬀects. The average direct and total marginal eﬀects are given in Table 2.
Most of the results clearly show that in response to a one point increase in any of the
environmental beneﬁts categories (except N5), farmers will increase their bids by less
than the dollar-equivalent amounts.7 In some of the categories, such as the long term
beneﬁts of cover (N4), the direct environmental beneﬁts eﬀect is so strong that it reverses
the sign of the positive strategic eﬀect so that the total eﬀect is always negative. For
example, a one point increase in N4 in the 18th sign-up will cause an average farmer to
reduce her bid by almost 12 cents. In this case the strong direct environmental eﬀect of
22 cents was partially oﬀset by a positive strategic eﬀect of 10 cents. In situations where
farmers care less about environmental beneﬁts, the positive strategic eﬀect dominates
and the overall eﬀect is positive.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the behavior of bidders in an auction in which two criteria
determine winners: a monetary bid and an environmental score. Modelling this unique
institution allows us to explain how bidders formulate asymmetric strategies with respect
to environmental criteria and to elicit farmers’ preferences towards diﬀerent types of
environmental goods. Although our model predicts a bidding strategy which is similar
to the symmetric, private value ﬁrst price sealed bid auction in which bids are marked-up
above cost, the model diﬀers from traditional auction models in two important aspects.
First, the CRP auctions oﬀ multiple objects simultaneously in the sense that all farmers
whose index exceeds the cut-oﬀ point are awarded the contract. Second, whereas in
the classic ﬁrst price auction models, where the object is awarded to the lowest bidder,
7By dollar-equivalent amount we mean the amount a farmer can decrease her bid in order to maintain
the total EBI score unchanged.
13here all bidders are not equally preferred by the buyer. The CRP has preference over
parcels of land represented by an environmental score. Identifying how farmers condition
their bids based on particular environmental beneﬁts their land can potentially generate
allows us to uncover farmers’ preferences towards various characteristics of non-market
goods.
Our theory predicts that farmers should condition their bids positively on higher
environmental score and negatively on the individual components of the score. The
empirical ﬁndings, based on the three recent auctions in North Carolina, are generally
supportive of the theoretical predictions of our model. In particular, we found that: a)
farmers condition bids on their environmental score and b) farmers value those envi-
ronmental beneﬁts which directly aﬀect the productivity of their land but do not value
those beneﬁts which resemble public goods.
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n2 0.0012∗ 0.0538∗ 3.4e-4 −0.0242∗ 8.4e-4∗ -0.0154∗
(1.2e-4) (0.0116) (2.1e-4) (0.0033) (2.6e-4) (0.0054)
n3 4.2e-5 -0.0322∗ 0.0013∗ −0.0223∗ 9.4e-4∗ −0.0159∗
(8.5e-5) (0.0111) (1.4e-4) (0.0033) (1.7e-4) (0.0035)
n4 −0.0011∗ −0.0212∗ 5.7e-5 −0.0196∗ 4.9e-4 -0.0159∗
(2.7e-4) (0.0026) (3.8e-4) (0.0026) (3.8e-4) (0.0031)
n5 -0.0208 -0.0977 0.0649 0.0803 -0.0014 -0.0283
(0.0116) (0.0543) (128.24) (199.89) (0.0273) (0.0576)
n6 0.0032∗ 0.0168 0.0042∗ -0.0196∗ -4.6e-4 -0.0128∗
(0.0011) (0.0104) (0.0017) (0.0047) (4.8e-4) (0.0026)
s 0.0654∗ 0.0318∗ 0.0692∗
(0.0286) (0.0041) (0.0093)
σ 0.1160 0.1145 0.1418 0.1392 0.1357 0.1330
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0036)
λ 1∗∗ -0.11 1∗∗ 0.76 1∗∗ 0.28
log likelihood 373.34 404.15 199.82 225.54 223.39 239.73
LLR χ2
1(λ = 0) 0.98 15.34∗ 0.88
LLR χ2
1(λ = 1) 83.74∗ 33.52∗ 22.42∗
sample size 2915 1631 999
number censored 1175 488 241
a Standard errors are in parenthesis.
∗ signiﬁcant at the 5% level
∗∗ restricted
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Sign-up N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 sb
Direct Eﬀect -0.020 0.039 -0.047 -0.245 -4.633 0.775 0.015
15 Total Eﬀect -0.005 0.054 -0.032 -0.230 -4.618 0.790
Direct Eﬀect -0.489 -0.461 -0.428 -0.596 3.853 -0.936 0.478
16 Total Eﬀect -0.011 0.016 0.050 -0.118 4.331 0.448
Direct Eﬀect 0.011 -0.055 -0.140 -0.220 -1.411 -0.453 0.103
18 Total Eﬀect 0.114 0.048 -0.037 -0.117 1.308 -0.350
a Eﬀects measured in dollars.
b This measures farmers’ perceived trade-oﬀ between environmental points and money.
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